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Foreword 
A group of eleven Ph.D. candidates from seven countries-Robin Cowan, An- 
drew Foster, Nedka Gateva, William Hodges, Arno Kitts, Eva Lelievre, Fernando 
Rajulton, Lucky Tedrow, Marc Tremblay, John Wilmoth, and Zeng Yi-worked togeth- 
er at IIASA from June 17 through September 6, 1985, in a seminar on population 
heterogeneity. The seminar w a s  led by the  two of us with the  help of Nathan Key- 
fitz, leader  of the  Population Program, and Bradley Gambill, Dianne Goodwin, and 
Alan Bernstein, r e sea rche r s  in t he  Population Program, as w e l l  as t he  occasional 
participation of guest scholars  at IIASA, including Michael Stoto, Sergei  Scherbov, 
Joel Cohen, Frans Willekens, Vladimir Crechuha, and Geert Ridder. Susanne Stock, 
ou r  secre ta ry ,  and Margaret T rabe r  managed the  seminar superbly. 
Each of t h e  eleven students in t h e  seminar succeeded in writing a r e p o r t  on 
the  research  they had done. With only one exception, the  students evaluated the  
seminar as "very productive"; t h e  exception thought i t  w a s  "productive". The two 
of us agree:  the  quality of t he  research  produced exceeded o u r  expectations and 
made the  summer a thoroughly enjoyable experience. W e  were particularly 
pleased by the  interest  and sparkle  displayed in o u r  daily, hour-long colloquium, 
and by t h e  sp i r i t  of cooperation all t he  participants, both students and more 
senior researchers ,  displayed in generously sharing ideas and otherwise helping 
each other .  
Robin Cowan succeeded in producing two papers  ove r  t h e  course of t h e  sum- 
mer, the  present  pape r  on t h e  long run  dynamics of some demographic processes 
being one of them. I t  addresses  an  important question, building on some research  
s ta r ted  at IIASA by W. Brian Arthur. N e w  ideas and f resh  approaches are needed 
in demography: this  pape r  is refreshingly innovative and may w e l l  represent  t h e  
start of a significant direation f o r  productive research .  
Anatoli I. Yashin 
James W. Vaupel 
Abstract 
This is very much a working paper.  I t  presents some preliminary resul ts  hav- 
ing t o  do with the  long run  dynamics of cer tain types of demographic processes.  A 
population i s  heterogeneous with regard  t o  i ts  preferences f o r  two alternatives A 
and B. If the  choice of alternatives displays increasing re turns ,  i.e. the  more one 
of t he  alternatives is chosen the  more at t ract ive i t  becomes, t he  long run  proper-  
t ies  of t he  system 'are,  in general,  not predictable. I t  may, however, have fixed 
points to  one of which t h e  system will converge. The stability of t he  fixed points 
depends very much on the  correlation of the  distribution of original preferences.  
A s  this is work in progress ,  suggested directions f o r  future research  are present- 
ed. 
Acknowledgments 
The author wishes to  acknowledge many useful conversations with Brian 
Arthur, also the helpful comments and suggestions of James Vaupel and Anatoli 
Yashin. This research was funded in part by a grant from the Andrew Mellon Foun- 
dation through the Population Studies Committee at  Stanford University. 
- vii - 
INCREASING FtETURNS TO SCALE 
IN HETEROGENEOUS POPULATIONS 
Robin Cowan 
Food Research Institute 
Stanford University 
Stanford. California 94305 
USA 
Introduction 
Many times in a lifetime an  individual i s  faced with choices between 
alternatives-where t o  go to university, whom t o  marry, whether o r  not to have 
another  child and s o  on. Many of these decisions, when viewed by themselves, have 
no effect on people o the r  than those directly involved. Where I decide t o  go t o  
university may certainly have a n  effect on the  financial s ta tus  of my parents  if 
they are footing the  bill, but i t  i s  very unlikely t o  have any noticeable effect  on 
the  course of history. Neither, from an  individual point of view, is my decision 
likely t o  t o  have any effect  on the  decisions tha t  o the r  people make. These state- 
ments seem unobjectionable when w e  are thinking of some part icular  individual. 
But suppose w e  view the  world as a system, made up of many such individuals. Deci- 
sions can now take  on another  aspect . This aspect  has  t o  do with the  capacity of a 
system of this  s o r t  t o  feed back on itself. What I mean by this i s  t ha t  cumulated in- 
dividual decisions, which by themselves appear  to be independent of each o the r  
and of what comes a f t e r  them, may have a n  effect  on future decisions. This i s  obvi- 
ously t r u e  in many cases: The cumulative ferti l i ty and migration decisions of indi- 
viduals this generation are certainly going t o  have a n  effect  on the  decisions of 
t he  next generation regarding social security,  t o  t ake  a timely example. There 
a r e ,  however, types of decisions where the  engendered effect  is not nearly s o  
clear. I have in mind situations in which decisions with r ega rd  to part icular  
choioes have a n  effect  on the  decisions of future agents with r ega rd  t o  the  same 
choice. For example, when I come t o  choose my school, many people have chosen 
schools before me. Any part icular  individual's decision will have no effect  on 
mine. I t  may be. however, tha t  t he  cumulative effect of t he  decisions of all those 
who have come before me is tha t  one school is large and the  o the r  is smal l .  I t  is 
c l ea r  tha t  if I have preferences with regard  t o  the  size of t he  school t o  which I go, 
this  cumulative effect  will influence my decision making. This type of phenomenon 
is r e f e r r ed  t o  in economics jargon as "returns t o  scale". To talk in terms of pro- 
duction, processes in which the  activity becomes more o r  less efficient as i t  is  
done more are said t o  have increasing o r  decreasing r e tu rns  t o  scale respectively. 
If the  n -th unit of output needs less input than does t h e  n -1-th unit of output, then 
the  production process  has  increasing re turns  t o  scale. The production of chil- 
d ren  might be  a n  example of one such process: A second child i s  almost certainly 
less expensive than a first--one can re-use such things as clothing, furniture,  ba- 
bysitting contacts and s o  on, and one has also accumulated a n  enormous amount of 
knowledge, s o  the  amount of time devoted t o  learning things about child-rearing 
fo r  t he  second child is considerably less than f o r  t he  f i rs t .  The cost  of the second 
child is less than the  cost  of t he  f i rs t ,  s o  w e  say that ,  at least  in this range, child- 
bearing has increasing r e tu rns  t o  scale. My concern here ,  though, is with 
processes tha t  are more social than something like child-rearing. In t he  case of 
child-rearing, t he  r e tu rns  t o  scale a r e  suffered by t h e  parent  who has t he  second 
child. They exis t  because tha t  same parent  has had the  f i r s t  child. If t h e r e  are 
r e tu rns  t o  scale in the  case of t he  choice of university, they will not be  suffered in 
t he  same way. That is t o  say tha t  my choice of Queen's is not going to make Queen's 
look be t te r  o r  worse f o r  me, but it may well do so  f o r  some one who is about t o  
choose where he wants to go to school. This i s  what I mean be  t h e  process  being so- 
cial, as opposed t o  private.  A demonstrative example of this  kind of social r e tu rns  
t o  scale is in the  choice of queues in a bank. A s  I en te r  t h e  bank, I see several  
lines, each of which leads t o  a separa te  te l ler ,  and each of which I might join. 
Clearly the  more people who, p r io r  t o  my arr ival ,  have joined t h e  line t o  teller A, 
relative t o  the  number of people who have joined any of t he  o the r  lines, t he  less 
a t t ract ive line A will be  t o  me. This is an  example of decreasing r e tu rns  t o  scale- 
the more something is done, t he  higher are t he  costs of doing it ,  o r  equivalently, 
t he  lower are the  benefits. (In this  case,  the 'costs' must be  seen in terms of what I 
lose by not choosing a different line.) 
Demography 
There are, I believe, many demographic phenomena which can be described at 
least partially in these terms. A c l ea r  example is the choice of language. In a bil- 
ingual country in which language use has not been w e l l  defined geographically, im- 
migrants have t o  choose which of the  languages they wish t o  learn. A s  well, 
parents  may have t o  decide which language t o  speak at home f o r  t he  purposes of 
teaching the i r  children. This is certainly the case in t he  province of Quebec, (less 
so  since 1977 and the  passage of Bill 101), where e i ther  English o r  French is spo- 
ken, and also in o ther  mainly r u r a l  regions in o the r  provinces of Canada where the  
choice is between English and French (or  often some o the r  language if t he  area i s  
populated largely by immigrants from the  same country.) This phenomenon is com- 
mon t o  many European countries, and also. t o  a much lesser extent,  t o  the  choice 
between English and Spanish in the  southwestern United States.  That t h e r e  a r e  in- 
creasing r e tu rns  to choice of language is c lear :  Choosing the  more common 
language increases one's potential social circle.  Particularly if the  community is 
small, o r  the  proportion of t he  population speaking the  less common language is 
small, choosing the  more common language increases greatly t he  chances tha t  the  
full range of social services-schools, l a w  courts,  hospitals and s o  on, will be  avail- 
able. The more people pick French, t he  more i t  costs t o  speak English. 
Another such phenomenon would be t h e  incidence of divorce. To a person who 
is unhappy in his marriage, t h e r e  are both costs and benefits to getting a divorce. 
I t  r ids  one of unpleasant living situation perhaps, but i t  also makes life more diffi- 
cult  in several  ways: One may lose p a r t  of one's acquaintances; i t  may w e l l  become 
more difficult t o  meet people; if one has children. t h e r e  may be a substantial in- 
crease in the  costs in terms of time spent of looking a f t e r  them; the re  w a s  also (not 
very long ago) a social stigma attached t o  being divorced. Virtually all of these 
problems are t o  some degree  alleviated as more and more people are in t he  state 
of being divorced. A s  a l a rge r  number of divorced people want t o  spend time en- 
gaged in social aativities, t he  number of facilities catering t o  single people r a t h e r  
than t o  couples w i l l  increase. This makes i t  eas ie r  t o  be  single. A s  well, as t h e r e  
are more and more single parents ,  t he  quantity of such things as daycare cent res  
w i l l  increase. (Indeed, i t  becomes possible t o  demand them as p a r t  of contract  
negotiations.) And, as has been apparent  over  t he  past several  decades, the  stig- 
m a  attached t o  divorce slowly disappears. I will not p re s s  this last claim f o r  i t  may 
be disputed tha t  this  is not a causal relationship, tha t  r a t h e r  t he  (exogenously) 
loose morals of t he  times a r e  t he  explanation f o r  t he  disappearance of this stigma, 
not t h e  f a c t  t h a t  many people in t h e  pas t  were willing t o  f a c e  it.  (I doubt t h a t  
morals become loose exogenously, and t h a t  a v e r y  good explanation f o r  t h e  
c u r r e n t  social  acceptabi l i ty  of d ivorce  i s  t h a t  s o  many people have been willing t o  
f a c e  t h e  stigmas of t h e  pas t .  If th is  general  kind of explanation is  c o r r e c t ,  then i t  
will a lso  work t o  explain,  at l eas t  in p a r t ,  t h e  r ising incidence of non-marital coha- 
bitation. I t  seems reasonable  t o  believe t h a t  t h e r e  have always been people who 
would have p r e f e r r e d  cohabitat ion t o  marr iage,  but t h a t  f o r  most of them t h e  
disapprobation suf fe red  would have out-weighed t h e  benefits ,  and s o  they married.  
I t  may a l so  b e  t h a t  f o r  some who would have p r e f e r r e d  i t ,  i t  n e v e r  e n t e r e d  t h e  
realm of possibility, simply because  i t  "wasn't done". F o r  whatever reason ,  
though, t h e r e  came along a n  increasing number of people who fe l t  t h a t  t h e  gains 
overwhelmed t h e  disapprobation and s o  did not b o t h e r  with marriage.  As t h e r e  
came t o  b e  more "normal" people in t h e  state of cohabitat ion,  i t  became more ac- 
ceptable ,  and more  p e o ~ l e  are finding t h a t  t h e  gains, net  of disapprobation,  are 
positive. If th i s  kind of a rmcha i r  sociology i s  c o r r e c t ,  then  we have  a n o t h e r  exam- 
ple  of increasing r e t u r n s  t o  scale . )  
The final example of increasing r e t u r n s  which I will deta i l  h a s  t o  d o  with t h e  
choice  of destination of migrants. In th is  exposition, I a m  thinking primarily of t h e  
emigration which took place  b e f o r e  1920 from Europe,  primarily Grea t  Britain and 
I re land,  t o  t h e  New World. When a n  agent  h a s  decided t o  migrate,  h e  must choose a 
destination. The majority of emigration from t h e  U.K. and I re land had as i t s  desti- 
nation e i t h e r  t h e  United S t a t e s  o r  Canada. I t  seems to m e  t h a t  in t h e  decision 
between t h e  t w o  destinations,  substantial  increasing r e t u r n s  t o  scale might b e  ex- 
pected t o  b e  operat ing.  T h e r e  are severa l  f a c t o r s  involved: In a migration t o  a 
f r o n t i e r ,  i t  seems t o  make good sense  t o  go t o  t h e  more populous place  (assuming 
t h a t  f r o n t i e r  remains t o  b e  se t t led) .  Once on t h e  homestead, a s e t t l e r  would c e r -  
tainly want a reasonably sized sett lement nearby  from which t o  obtain t h e  supplies 
t h a t  h e  could not produce himself--nails, lumber, s u g a r  and s o  on. Though th i s  may 
b e  a n  important f a c t o r  f o r  a c e r t a i n  e r a ,  i t  i s  not appl icable  if t h e  immigrant i s  not 
a homesteader but  r a t h e r  a l aboure r .  In th i s  case, however, t h e r e  are s e v e r a l  
o t h e r  f a c t o r s  contributing t o  increasing r e t u r n s  t o  scale .  Information about  poten- 
t ial  destinations is  v e r y  important to migrants, and i t  i s  c lear ly  e a s i e r  t o  ge t  infor- 
mation about  t h e  p lace  t o  which t h e  l a r g e r  propor t ion of migrants h a s  gone. There  
will b e  more l e t t e r s  home, e i t h e r  to t h e  f u t u r e  migrant himself, o r  t o  h is  f r iends ,  
and local  newspapers will b e  more in teres ted in t h e  a f f a i r s  of t h e  destination in 
which t h e r e  are more expatr io ts .  There  may well b e  information available about  
both places ,  but  if t h e  r e p o r t s  are more or less  equally glowing, t h e n  t h e  destina- 
t ion f o r  which t h e r e  are more r e p o r t s  will b e  s tochast ica l ly  p r e f e r r e d .  Think of 
t h e  potential  migrant  as a r r a n g i n g  his information abou t  e a c h  place  in t w o  
s e p a r a t e  distributions--he h a s  a c e r t a i n  number of observat ions  at e a c h  level  of 
"goodness of destination". Then if t h e  means of t h e  t w o  distr ibutions are approxi-  
mately equal ,  more observa t ions  will d e c r e a s e  t h e  va r i ance ,  and so make t h e  more 
observed  t h e  more  p r e f e r r e d .  T h e r e  i s  also t h e  l a r g e  f a c t o r  of des i r ing to join 
f r i ends  and re la t ives .  In a survey  conducted among immigrants to t h e  United 
S t a t e s  in 1909,  fully 94% of those  asked s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e y  were going to join family 
or f r i ends  (Tomaske). T h e r e  i s  also t h e  f a c t  t h a t  previous  migrants are ab le  to 
remit  passage money to f u t u r e  migrants. In a similar su rvey  to t h e  one mentioned 
above,  30% of those  asked  responded t h a t  t h e i r  passages  had been financially as- 
s i s t ed  by some one  who had  previously migrated (Tomaske). These  f a c t o r s  are all 
indications of increas ing r e t u r n s  to scale. 
I t  i s  clear t h a t  increas ing r e t u r n s  to s c a l e  i s  a f e a t u r e  common to many demo- 
g raph ic  p rocesses ,  and i t  i s  not  at all difficult to find examples in o t h e r  walks of 
life. I t  would b e  su rp r i s ing  indeed,  though, if all of t h e  r e t u r n s  inc reased  in exac t -  
ly t h e  same manner: Changing t h e  p ropor t ion  of pas t  migrants  who have  chosen Ca- 
nada will have  a c e r t a i n  e f f e c t  on  t h e  des i rabi l i ty  of Canada to f u t u r e  migrants. 
This e f fec t  i s  likely to b e  v e r y  di f ferent  from t h e  e f f e c t  on  t h e  des i rabi l i ty  of 
cohabitat ion of changing t h e  p ropor t ion  a l ready  cohabit ing.  I t  would b e  a p p r o p r i -  
ate, then ,  to study t h e  n a t u r e  of p r o c e s s e s  subject  to increas ing r e t u r n s  in as gen- 
eral a way as possible. 
One in teres t ing a s p e c t  of such p r o c e s s e s  i s  t h e i r  long r u n  behaviour .  Does 
t h e  p ropor t ion  of migrants who chose  Canada as t h e i r  dest ination settle down in 
t h e  long r u n ,  or i s  i t  always moving? If all of t h e  members of t h e  population are 
identical ,  as i s  of ten  assumed in demographic analysis ,  then  t h e  answer  is clear--  
eve ryone  does  t h e  same thing t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  pe r son  does.  (If t h e r e  are decreas ing  
r e t u r n s  to sca le ,  th i s  i s  not  necessar i ly  t r u e .  In f a c t  only in unusual c a s e s  will i t  
b e  t rue . )  If ,  however,  t h e  population i s  heterogeneous ,  some analysis  i s  needed 
b e f o r e  such s ta tements  c a n  b e  made. 
In r e c e n t  work,  A r t h u r  (1985a) h a s  analysed a similar  problem having to d o  
with competing technologies.  In h is  model t h e  population i s  divided into t w o  homo- 
geneous sub-groups of equal  size.  These two g roups  are c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e i r  
r e spec t ive  gains from adopting one  or o t h e r  of t w o  competing technologies. The 
total gain to a n  individual from adopting technology A i s  a f fec ted  by t h e  number of 
people who have adopted t h a t  technology before  him. H e r e  again is a system which 
exhibi ts  r e t u r n s  t o  scale .  Ar thur  analysed th is  system under  s e v e r a l  d i f ferent  re- 
t u r n s  regimes, viewing t h e  propor t ion of adop te r s  who have chosen technology A 
as a random walk. He found t h a t  under  regimes of constant  o r  decreas ing r e t u r n s  
t o  scale ,  t h e  propor t ion of t h e  people who have adopted technology A goes t o  1/2 
with probabil i ty 1 as time goes t o  infinity. With unbounded increasing r e t u r n s ,  with 
probabil i ty 1 t h e  propor t ion goes t o  z e r o  o r  one,  but  t o  which i t  goes cannot b e  
predic ted.  Under bounded increasing r e t u r n s ,  t h e  behaviour of t h e  system depends 
v e r y  much on t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  bounds. 
In r e l a t e d  work, Ar thur  (1985b) h a s  built a model of industrial  location under  
increasing r e t u r n s .  In t h a t  model, a f irm chooses i t s  location based on t h e  in- 
h e r e n t  a t t r ac t iveness  ( to t h a t  firm) of t h e  location, and on t h e  r e t u r n s  t h e  firm re- 
ceives  from t h e r e  being o t h e r  f irms a l ready  located t h e r e .  The firms of th i s  model 
are much more heterogeneous  than t h e  adop te r s  of h is  competing technologies 
model, in t h a t  f irms may d i f fe r  a g r e a t  deal  from e a c h  o t h e r  with r e g a r d  t o  how 
they  view t h e  inherent  a t t r ac t iveness  of a par t i cu la r  location. Ar thur  obtained 
resu l t s  ve ry  similar t o  those  of his competing technologies model. An open ques- 
tion remains,  however, whether  t h e  distr ibution of t h e  p r i o r  tastes of t h e  firms,  o r  
migrants, in pa r t i cu la r  t h e  cor re la t ion  of th is  distr ibution,  can  a f fec t  t h e  outcome. 
I t  i s  th i s  question t h a t  I wish t o  a d d r e s s  in th i s  p a p e r ,  using a var ia t ion of Ar thur ' s  
industrial  location model. (I will talk now only in t e r m s  of migration, but  t h e  
analysis, I think,  is equally applicable,  possibly with minor revisions,  t o  t h e  o t h e r  
phenomena discussed.) These p r i o r  tastes I will r e f e r  t o  as predilections,  and they 
can  b e  seen  as t h e  d e s i r e  a migrant h a s  f o r  one o r  o t h e r  of t h e  destinations,  ignor- 
ing any of t h e  e f fec t s  of r e t u r n s  t o  scale .  W e  might ask  each  potential  migrant, 
"Ignoring any possible considerations having t o  d o  with t h e  number of people al- 
ready  t h e r e ,  how much d o  you want t o  go t o  Canada? How much do you want t o  go t o  
t h e  United States?".  The answers  t o  t h e s e  questions will g e n e r a t e  an  o r d e r e d  p a i r  
f o r  each  potential  migrant, and t h e s e  o r d e r e d  p a i r s  can  b e  mapped onto  t h e  x-y 
plane (see  Figure 1 in which e a c h  point r e p r e s e n t s  a potential  migrant). 
Figure 1. Map of p r e f e r e n c e s  of potential  migrants f o r  two dif ferent  destinations. 
W e  can assume t h a t  t h e s e  predilections form a probabil i ty distr ibution.  Each 
migrant makes his  choice  of destination based on t h e  utility h e  will r ece ive  from 
each  of t h e  two places.  Every  migrant's utilities will be  determined by his predi-  
lections and by t h e  level  of r e t u r n s  t o  sca le  f o r  e a c h  of t h e  two places.  S o  t h e  mi- 
g r a n t  who h a s  predilections (x,y), where x i s  h is  predilection f o r  Canada, y f o r  
t h e  United S ta tes ,  will see his  utility from going t o  Canada as x + HC(Nc), where 
HC(.) i s  some function which r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e t u r n s  to scale result ing from 
Canada's population being Nc at t h e  time of h is  choice.  Likewise, his utility from 
going t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  will b e  y + Hu (Nu). When i t  comes time t o  decide where 
t o  go, t h e  migrant simply chooses  t h e  destination which will give him t h e  highest  
utility. 
The Model 
The model i s  v e r y  simple then.  If w e  c h a r a c t e r i z e  each  of t h e  potential  mi- 
g r a n t s  by his  coordinates  on t h e  x -y plane, t h e  migrant Rzy will g o  t o  Canada if 
and only if x + H C  (Nc) 2 y + HU (Nu). Otherwise, RZy will go t o  t h e  United S ta tes .  
From t h e  migrants'  point of view, at t h e  time of his d e p a r t u r e ,  h is  destination is  
perfect ly  determined--he knows Nc and Nu, so h e  simply works out  x + (N,) and 
y + HU (.nl,), and goes to t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  place.  From t h e  point of view of a n  ob- 
s e r v e r ,  however, t h e  system is  not s o  predic table .  The problem i s  t h a t  t h e  ob- 
s e r v e r  does not know which migrant i s  next .  If w e  knew t h e  o r d e r  of t h e  Rzy 's, t h e  
system would b e  completely deterministic. But t h e  o r d e r  i s  random--to t h e  ob- 
s e r v e r ,  t h e  next  migrant a p p e a r s  t o  b e  drawn randomly from t h e  distr ibution of mi- 
grants .  W e  can,  however, make probabil ist ic statements about  t h e  next  Rzy .
Since w e  are in te res ted  in t h e  dynamics of t h e  system and  not t h e  migrants 
themselves, t h e  next  Rzy i s  not real ly  t h a t  important,  o r  r a t h e r  i s  s o  only inciden- 
tally. What w e  rea l ly  c a r e  about  i s  whether o r  not t h e  nex t  migrant goes t o  Cana- 
da .  S o  what w e  want t o  know is  whether f o r  t h e  next migrant 
z + HC(Nc) r y + H"(NU). And if w e  know N, and Nu, w e  c a n  make probabil ist ic 
statements about  this.  
At th i s  point, i t  would b e  well t o  think about  t h e  na tu re  of t h e  increasing re- 
t u r n s  t o  sca le  functions HU and p. What w e  actually c a r e  about  i s  t h e  inequality 
z + HC (N,) $ y + XY (Nu ). This can b e  r e a r r a n g e d  t o  z f y + [XY (Nu ) - b (Nc )]. 
Let us l e t  G (Nc ,Nu) = [H" (lk, ) - HC (N,)]. G (Nc ,Nu) tells us how much more t h e  
United S t a t e s  h a s  gained from r e t u r n s  t o  scale than  Canada h a s  at t h e  levels of po- 
pulation c u r r e n t  in t h e  two countries.  In o t h e r  words, f o r  a potential  migrant 
whose predilections show no p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  e i t h e r  of t h e  destinations,  (i.e. z = 
y ) ,  G(Nc,Nu) will tell us  how much h e  p r e f e r s  t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  Canada at t h e  
population levels Nu and N,, respectively.  W e  would, I think, expec t  G t o  b e  a 
function of t h e  r a t i o s  of t h e  two populations. The r e a s o n  f o r  th is  i s  t h a t  in t h e  
eyes  of a potential  migrant, t h e  di f ference between 1000 and 1100 is  much bigger  
than is  t h e  di f ference between 100,000 and 100,100. This i s  t r u e  f o r  two reasons:  
Of any one of his f r i ends  who have migrated,  t h e  probabil i ty t h a t  t h e  f r iend h a s  
gone t o  Canada will b e  equal t o  t h e  propor t ion of t h e  to ta l  migrant population t h a t  
h a s  gone t o  Canada. (This i s  from t h e  point of view of t h e  o b s e r v e r  who does  not 
know who t h e  next  migrant will be ,  and s o  knows nothing about h is  fr iendship net-  
works.) The second reason  h a s  t o  d o  with t h e  se rv ices  provided in each of t h e  two 
places. Suppose t h a t  Nu - Nc = g ,  where g i s  a positive constant.  We would ex- 
pec t  t h a t  t h e  level  of se rv ices  available in t h e  United S t a t e s  would b e  h igher  than  
in Canada. I t  would a l so  make sense ,  though, t o  believe t h a t  t h e  di f ference in t h e  
levels of se rv ices  available would b e  g r e a t e r ,  t h e  smaller  i s  Nu. Suppose we think 
in terms of d i s c r e t e  levels of se rv ices ,  which have population thresholds  associat-  
e d  with them. That is ,  when a population threshold  is  r eached ,  t h e  nex t  level  of 
s e r v i c e s  is  added. This i s  one of t h e  notions underlying h i e r a r c h y  models in re- 
gional economics (Richardson, 1973). I t  i s  likely t h a t  t h e  thresholds  a r e  c l o s e r  to- 
g e t h e r  (in t e rms  of absolute  numbers) at lower levels of population. By t h e  time 
t h e  population h a s  reached  100,000 w e  would not b e  likely t o  g e t  t h e  next  level  of 
se rv ices  by adding 100 people. I t  is f a r  more likely t o  b e  t r u e  tha t  adding 100 peo- 
ple  does  make th i s  d i f ference when w e  begin with a population of 1000. 
I assume now t h a t  t h e  r e t u r n s  t o  sca le  are t h e  same in t h e  two countries.  This 
1 
means t h a t  G ( N c , N u )  i s  symmetric about - S o  if N  i s  t h e  to ta l  number of migrants 
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( N  = N c  + N u )  then  G ( a N , ( l  - a ) N )  = - G ( ( l  - a ) N , a N ) .  Thus, G ( . 5 N ,  . 5 N )  = O .  
Since G  measures how much ahead  one of t h e  countr ies  i s  in t h e  r e t u r n s  t o  sca le  
race, w e  need only say  t h a t  G  i s  positive if t h e  country  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  f i r s t  
argument h a s  t h e  l a r g e r  population. The names of t h e  countr ies  d o  not matter. 
The convention I will adopt  i s  tha t  Canada will t a k e  t h e  f i r s t  argument,  and s o  when 
t h e  population of Canada is  l a r g e r ,  G  i s  positive. One more important simplifica- 
tion, I will assume t h a t  G  i s  not a function of t h e  to ta l  s ize  of t h e  migrant popula- 
tion, and s o  w e  can  write G ( a N ,  ( 1  - a ) N )  = H ( a ) ,  where a i s  t h e  propor t ion of mi- 
g r a n t s  who have gone t o  Canada. Since w e  are looking at systems which display in- 
creas ing r e t u r n s ,  as one  of t h e  destinations ge t s  ahead in population, i t  ge t s  ahead 
in a t t r ac t iveness ,  so  H  i s  increasing in a. I assume t h a t  i t  i s  monotone. 
I r e t u r n  now t o  t h e  distr ibution of predilections.  With r e g a r d  t o  predilections 
alone,  each  migrant finds one  of t h e  two possible destinations p r e f e r a b l e  t o  t h e  
o t h e r .  T h e r e  will a l so  b e  some migrants who are indifferent between t h e  two. This 
set of potential  migrants will b e  mapped onto  a r a y  running through t h e  origin at 
45". Along this  r a y ,  which I will r e f e r  t o  as t h e  r a y  of indifference,  x = y .  Anyone 
below this  r a y  p r e f e r s  Canada, anyone above i t  p r e f e r s  t h e  United S ta tes .  N o w  w e  
t a k e  account of t h e  increasing r e t u r n s  function. If a > . 5 ,  t h e r e  are more people 
in Canada. This means t h a t  f o r  anyone whose predilections lay on t h e  line of in- 
1 difference,  Canada is  now p r e f e r r e d  s ince  H ( a )  > 0 f o r  a > - In fac t ,  t h e  whole 
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distr ibution is  shifted t o  t h e  r igh t ,  s ince  f o r  e v e r y  potential  migrant t h e r e  is  t h e  
same added bonus f o r  going t o  Canada. Similarly, if a < .5,  t h e r e  are more people 
in t h e  United S ta tes ,  and s o  t h e  US looks b e t t e r  than  Canada t o  those  who were 
previously indifferent.  The US gains in everyone's  eyes ,  s o  t h e  distr ibution shi f ts  
up. This shifting of t h e  distr ibution up o r  t o  t h e  r igh t ,  can b e  seen  as equivalent t o  
moving t h e  r a y  of indifference down o r  up respect ively ,  s ince  what w e  are in- 
t e r e s t e d  in is  actually who p r e f e r s  Canada, and who p r e f e r s  t h e  United S ta tes .  The 
r a y  of indifference divides t h e  distr ibution of migrants into these  two groups,  s o  if 
t h e  distr ibution is  shi f ted  pointwise by a constant,  i t  i s  equivalent t o  shifting t h e  
dividing line. Now t o  make l ife easy,  w e  can  simply sca le  H ( a )  s o  t h a t  i t  i s  equal t o  
t h e  shift  of t h e  r a y  of indifference (see Figure 2, which is  t h e  distribution of Fig- 
ure 1 with contour  lines drawn on it). Since t h e  next  migrant is  drawn from t h e  dis- 
tr ibution, t h e  probability tha t  he  p re fe r s  Canada is  equal to t h e  mass of t he  distri-  
bution which falls below t h e  r a y  of indifference. S o  to make probabilistic state- 
ments about t h e  destination of t h e  next migrant, if w e  know t h e  initial distribution 
of predilections, w e  need only know the  location of t h e  r a y  of indifference. This i s  
a function of t h e  proport ion of migrants who have a l ready  gone to Canada. W e  
have now come full c i rc le ,  and the  feedback na tu re  of t h e  system is apparent.  
prefer U.S. / ray  of  indifference 
I 
predilection 
for  U.S. 
prefer  Ceneda 
- - 
predilection for  Can 
Figure 2. Map of preferences  of potential migrants fo r  two different  destinations. 
Results of the Podel 
Here  i t  would b e  nice to begin an examination of a gener ic  probability distri- 
bution in o r d e r  to look at t h e  dynamics of such a system. The interesting questions 
have  to do with fixed points. From recen t  resu l t s  of Arthur ,  Ermoliev and 
Kaniovski (1985). w e  know tha t  with probability one, a model such as h a s  been 
descr ibed will s e t t l e  down to a stable  fixed point. By a fixed point, I mean a value 
of a such tha t  t h e  probability tha t  t h e  next migrant goes to Canada is  equal to a. 
What th i s  means is tha t  t h e r e  is  no systematic tendency f o r  t h e  proportion of t h e  
migrant population in Canada to change. If fixed points exis t ,  and particularly if 
they a r e  s table ,  then w e  may be able t o  make statements about t he  long run  
behaviour of the relative sizes of the  populations of Canada and the  United States.  
Unfortunately, at this s tage  of r e sea rch ,  a generic probability distribution is 
beyond r each ,  s o  I have r e t r ea t ed  t o  a part icular  distribution. The distribution I 
use is Gumbel's bivariate exponential distribution (Johnson and Kotz, 1972, pp. 
262). A bivariate exponential distribution i s  not wholly unreasonable if w e  ap- 
propriately choose t he  population about which to  be  concerned. Suppose the  po- 
pulation are those people who have definitely decided t o  migrate. The decision 
process might be character ised as follows: Conditions in t he  home country become 
s o  bad tha t  migration is decided upon--people believe t ha t  no matter how many peo- 
ple t h e r e  are in t he  N e w  World, conditions t he re  are be t t e r  than they are in t he  
Old World. Then, having become potential migrants, people examine the  popula- 
tions in t he  two possible destinations t o  decide which would be  t he  be t t e r  place t o  
go. This i s  c lear ly  a model of push-migration, in tha t  t he  momentum t o  migrate is  
generated in t he  source  country. This is  most appropr ia te  in situations like t he  Ir-  
ish potato famine, o r  f o r  migrations due t o  religious persecution. The stochastic 
process  of a pull-migration model has a different na ture  and s o  produces different 
results.' The exponential na ture  of t he  distribution implies t ha t  t h e r e  are many 
people who have predilections which map them to  points which are nea r  the  origin. 
In o the r  words, many people do not have very s t rong predilections, though t h e r e  
are a f e w  fo r  whom they are very strong. 
The joint distribution of predilections, then, is  assumed t o  be  
And so  
P r (Y<y  I X = x )  = [ 1  -/3(2e-z-1)][1 - e y ]  + B(2eZ -1 ) (1  - e - 2 ~ )  , 
where is  4 times t he  correlation coefficient, and is  res t r ic ted  t o  [-1,1]. (This un- 
-1 1 fortunately r e s t r i c t s  t he  correlation of the  distribution t o  [- -1.) A s  noted be- 
4 ' 4  
fore ,  the  probability tha t  t he  next migrant goes t o  Canada is  t he  m a s s  of the  distri- 
 or example i f  all migrants  are  pulled b y  r e l a t i v e s  who have prev ious ly  migra ted ,  and t h e  order  
in which previous migrants  "pull" i s  not pre-determined, then  t h e  migrat ion looks  l i k e  a  Polya pro- 
c e s s ,  and t h e  proportion o f  migrants  in  Canada can s e t t l e  down t o  any point in t h e  in terva l  [0,1]. 
I f ,  however ,  some portion o f  t h e  migrants  a r e  not pulled, but choose randomly between des t ina t ions  
I 
I (and then pull t h e i r  r e l a t i v e s ) ,  t h e  proportion o f  migrants  in  Canada wil l  go t o  - I am gra te fu l  t o  2 ' 
Brian Arthur f o r  t h i s  point.  
bution below t h e  r a y  of indifference.  This r a y  is t h e  line Y = x + H(a) .  S o  what 
w e  want t o  know is  Pr (Y < x + H(a)) .  A s  a n  intermediate s t ep ,  if w e  set H(a)  = h ,  
w e  can  write 
To find t h e  unconditional probabil i ty,  w e  must in tegra te  o v e r  x E (0,00) t o  g e t  
where t h e  final e i s  from t h e  marginal distr ibution of X. 
After much smoke c l e a r s ,  and let t ing Pr (Y < x + h )  equal Q ( a ) ,  w e  find t h a t  
Q ( a )  maps from t h e  in terval  [0,3.] onto [0,3.] and is  continuous, s o  by Brower's 
fixed point theorem, w e  know t h a t  at l eas t  one fixed point exis ts .  That i s ,  t h e r e  i s  
0 
some a such t h a t  if t h e  propor t ion of pas t  migrants who have gone t o  Canada i s  
0 0 
equal t o  a,  then t h e  probabil i ty t h a t  t h e  nex t  migrant goes t o  Canada i s  equal t o  a. 
I We s ta ted  e a r l i e r  t h a t  H(') = 0. Substituting th i s  into Q ( a ) ,  where a  = - 2 2 ' 
1  
w e  find t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a f ixed point at a = - Due t o  t h e  symmetry of t h e  problem, 
2 ' 
both in t h e  distr ibution and in t h e  r e t u r n s  t o  scale ,  th i s  i s  not surpr is ing.  Because 
t h e  problem is  s o  symmetric, when w e  are looking f o r  fixed points and t h e i r  pro-  
p e r t i e s ,  w e  need only look on one s ide  of t h e  midpoint. That i s  t o  say  t h a t  w e  can 
1  
concen t ra te  o u r  a t tent ion on t h e  in terval  [-,I] .  
2 
One of t h e  important questions t o  ask about  f ixed points i s  whether  o r  not they  
are a t t r a c t o r s .  From r e c e n t  resu l t s  by Hill, Lane and Sudder th  (1980), w e  know 
t h a t  a fixed point i s  a n  a t t r a c t o r  if and only if i t  i s  a downcrossing of t h e  diagonal, 
i .e. if t h e  slope of t h e  function Q ( a )  i s  l e s s  than 1  at t h e  fixed point. (The set of at- 
t r a c t o r s  is t h e  set of points t o  which t h e  system will converge with non-zero proba-  
bility .) 
1  I will f i r s t  examine t h e  point a  = - and then t u r n  my at tent ion t o  o t h e r  possi- 2 
ble  f ixed points. What w e  need t o  know in o r d e r  t o  t e l l  if a fixed point i s  a n  attrac- 
tor or not,  i s  t h e  slope of t h e  function Q ( a )  at t h a t  point. Differentiating Q ( a )  with 
r e s p e c t  to a we g e t  
When is  th is  quanti ty g r e a t e r  than  I? Using t h e  bounds on 8,  we can  say t h a t  
I t  is  no s u r p r i s e  t h a t  t h e  slope of Q ( a )  depends crucial ly on t h e  r e t u r n s  function 
H ( a ) .  T h e r e  are s e v e r a l  conditions. though, under  which we can  draw conclusions 
I 
about  whether  or not - i s  a n  a t t r a c t o r .  
2  
dH 1 )  If - 1 > 3 at a = - then - 1 2  aQ > 1 so - i s  a n  upcrossing,  and so is not a n  at- d a  aa 2  
t r a c t o r .  In o t h e r  words, if increasing r e t u r n s  come into play v e r y  quickly 
and v e r y  powerfully, then  with probabil i ty 1 t h e  system will move away from 
1 t h e  point -. This i s  as one  would expect--if t h e r e  are v e r y  l a r g e  gains to go- 2  
ing to t h e  more populous place,  then i t  seems v e r y  unlikely t h a t  t h e  population 
will remain equally divided between t h e  two places.  
dH 3 2 )  If - 1 1 2 ' aQ < 1, so - i s  a downcrossing and so i s  a n  at- < - at a = - then  -d a  2  aa 2  
1 
t r a c t o r .  In o t h e r  words, if t h e  increasing r e t u r n s  are small n e a r  - then  t h e  2  ' 
randomness of t h e  o r d e r  of migration will, with probabil i ty 1, keep  t h e  pro-  
1 por t ions  at - (given t h a t  t h a t  i s  where  we start t h e  system from). 2 
3) I f - < -  1 dH 5 3,  then  whether  or not - i s  a n  a t t r a c t o r  depends solely on 8. To 2 d a  2  
find t h a t  dependency,  we simply t a k e  t h e  der ivat ive  of aQ with r e s p e c t  to 8 ,  
aa 
1 
at t h e  value a = - 
2  
This value is  non-negative, s ince  we have assumed t h a t  H ( a )  i s  a monotonically 
increasing function. If we a l so  assume tha t  increasing r e t u r n s  t o  scale  a r e  
1 a a~ 
operat ive  at a l l  points n e a r  - then -(-) i s  s t r i c t ly  positive. What th is  
2 ' ag aa 
means is  t h a t  t h e  h igher  (positive) is t h e  corre la t ion of t h e  distr ibution of 
predilections,  t h e  l e ss  likely (where the  "sample space"  is the  set of functions 
1 H ( a ) )  i t  i s  tha t  t h e  system will se t t l e  down t o  -. This seems reasonable.  If t h e  
2 
1 
corre la t ion is high,  (but symmetric about -) then t h e r e  are many people 
2 
whose predilections give close t o  equal value t o  Canada and t h e  United S ta tes .  
They will readily change t h e i r  p re fe rences ,  and s o  send t h e  propor t ion of po- 
l tential  migrants who p r e f e r  Canada away from - if t h e  population of one 
2 
country  ge t s  slightly l a r g e r  than t h e  o t h e r .  If ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  distr i-  
bution of predilections h a s  a small (high negative) cor re la t ion ,  then t h e r e  are 
relat ively many people who have s t rong predilections and s o  will not easily 
change t h e i r  p re fe rences .  For  many of them, t h e i r  predilections will outweigh 
t h e  r e t u r n s  t o  sca le  when i t  i s  time t o  make t h e i r  choice.  (It i s  important t o  
remember,  in th is  r e g a r d ,  tha t  if choice of destination were based on predi-  
1 lections alone,  t h e  propor t ion of migrants in Canada would go t o  - with pro-  
2 
bability 1 ,  due t o  t h e  symmetry of t h e  distribution.) 
1 Something worth noting i s  tha t ,  as w e  can see from Figure 3, if - i s  not a n  at- 
2 
1 1 t r a c t o r ,  then t h e r e  must be  more fixed points in t h e  r a n g e  (-,I]. If - i s  not a n  at- 
2 2 
t r a c t o r  then i t  i s  un upcrossing,  s o  Q ( a )  must re-cross  t h e  diagonal, possibly at 1, 
1 in o r d e r  t h a t  i t  b e  defined on t h e  whole range  [-,I]. 
2 
Figure 3. Probability that  next migrant goes t o  Canada as  a function of proportion 
of migrant population currently in Canada. 
I turn attention now t o  o ther  fixed points. One of the  reasons f o r  undertaking 
this enterprise w a s  t o  examine the long run behaviour of this type of system. One 
very interesting event would be that  in the long run all of the migrants went t o  the 
same destination. I ask now what would be necessary fo r  this t o  take  place. In oth- 
er words, under what conditions is 1 (or 0) a an attracting fixed point? If 1 is a 
fixed point, then 
o r  equivalently, 
There are two possible solutions. The f irs t  is  that e-H( l )  = 0. In this case, 
H(1) = -. O r  more properly, lim H(a )  = -. This implies that the  increasing re- 
a -1 
- k - L  or turns t o  scale are unbounded. The second solution is that e 4 ( l )  - 6 2 '  
tha t  -H(l) = ln($ - $). If this solution i s  t o  be  w e l l  defined. then i t  must be  that  
( - ) 0 O r  that 6 2 3. But there  is  a restriction (coming from the  specifica- 6 2 
tion of the  distribution) that  -1 S 6 S 1. Thus the second soiution is  never w e l l  de- 
fined, so  the  only condition under which 1 i s  a fixed point is that the  increasing re- 
t u r n s  t o  scale  b e  unbounded, so  tha t  H ( l )  = 0.  This s tands  t o  reason:  Any out l iers  
in t h e  distr ibution indicate ve ry  s t rong  predilections f o r  one  of t h e  two destina- 
tions. If t h e  r e t u r n s  are bounded, by finite m say ,  then  t h e r e  will b e  some poten- 
t ial  migrants whose predilections f o r  t h e  United S t a t e s  are g r e a t e r  than m ,  since 
t h e  distribution has  infinite tai ls .  These migrants in t h e  tai ls  make up a fixed pro- 
portion of t h e  to ta l  migrant population, s o  t h e  propor t ion who go t o  Canada can 
never  ge t  t o  1--these out l iers  will always go t o  t h e  United Sta tes .  
If 1 i s  f ixed,  i s  i t  a n  a t t r a c t o r ?  To answer th is  question, w e  need t o  know 
whether Q ( a )  approaches  1 from above o r  below t h e  r a y  Q ( a )  = a .  Equivalently, 
w e  need t o  know whether t h e  slope at 1 is less  than o r  g r e a t e r  than 1. 
d Q !  s i n c e  lim [ l e - H ( a )  + +(-e-H(a) + ~e- 'H(a)) l  = 0 ,  then if < w , xia=, = 0.2 da 
and 1 i s  s table .  There  are, however, functions H ( a )  such t h a t  H ( l )  = but  
d Q  ; 
-, a=1 = 0.  In th is  case ,  i t  must b e  t h a t  da 
This inequality places  a n  u p p e r  bound on t h e  speed at which H ( a )  inc reases  as a 
approaches  1. 
I We can see from Figure 4 t h a t  if both - and 1 are not a t t r a c t o r s ,  ( 1  need not 
2 
b e  a fixed point f o r  th is  t o  b e  t r u e )  then t h e r e  must be  an  a t t r ac t ing  fixed point 
0 1 O 0 between them. That i s  t o  say  t h a t  t h e r e  exis ts  a n  a such t h a t  - < a < 1 and a i s  2 
both fixed and a t t r ac t ing .  
Figure 4. Probability tha t  next migrant goes t o  Canada as function of proportion of 
migrant population currently in Canada. 
A t  such a point, i t  must be  tha t  
0 
This is quadratic in e -H(a ) ,  s o  we can solve t o  get  
Unfortunately we cannot say very much about this without specifying H ( a )  more 
fully than has  been done, and observing tha t  t he  value 8 = 0 will need special 
0 
treatment. I t  is  worth noting, though, tha t  the  value a will be  a function of 8, and 
s o  of the  correlat ion of the  distribution. 
Discussion 
P a r t  of t he  purpose of this paper  has  been t o  demonstrate tha t  in a demo- 
graphic process  which exhibits increasing r e tu rns  t o  scale ,  the  long run outcome 
of the  process  is not always deterministic. We have examined some cases h e r e  in 
which one can  make probabilistic statements about t h e  outcome, but not much 
more. P a r t  of t h e  reason f o r  t h e  lack of specific statements has  been t h e  general-  
ity of t h e  model. Were t h e  increasing r e t u r n s  function t o  b e  specified more fully, 
more detail  could be  given about t h e  outcome of t h e  process .  I t  i s  c l e a r ,  though, 
t h a t  in a system of t h e  type which h a s  been modelled h e r e ,  i t  i s  not generally t r u e  
tha t  w e  can predic t  t h e  outcome. There  will b e  pa r t i cu la r  cases  in which w e  can,  (if 
1 
t h e  only fixed point i s  - f o r  example) but in general  t h e  bes t  w e  will be  ab le  t o  d o  
2 
i s  t o  specify t h e  set of points t o  which t h e r e  is  a positive probabil i ty t h a t  t h e  sys- 
t e m  will converge.  
One interesting resul t  t h a t  has  appeared  is  t h e  relat ionship between t h e  con- 
vergence points of t h e  system and t h e  corre la t ion of t h e  distr ibution of predilec- 
tions. Differences in predilections was t h e  way in which o u r  population was 
heterogeneous.  The inference t h a t  might b e  drawn from this  i s  t h a t  t h e  form of 
heterogeneity i s  important t o  t h e  long r u n  dynamics of population systems. In th i s  
model, t h e  di f ferences  t h a t  matter t ake  a par t i cu la r  form--namely t h e  corre la t ion 
between t h e  p r i o r  utilities gained from each of t h e  two destinations. One might b e  
tempted t o  suppose t h a t  t h e  more similar t h e  individuals of a population are, t h e  
more likely t h e  population i s  t o  behave like a homogeneous one. In th i s  model, 
however, what i s  c ruc ia l  i s  how each individual views t h e  two a l ternat ives .  The po- 
pulation may b e  very  d iverse  with r e g a r d  t o  t h e  level  af a t t ract iveness  of migra- 
tion (i.e.,  t h e  distance from t h e  origin of t h e  o r d e r e d  p a i r s  ( z  , y )), but if each in- 
dividual i s  indifferent between t h e  two destinations (i.e., z = y ) ,  then t h e  popula- 
tion will a p p e a r  t o  b e  homogeneous. 
There  are two next  s t e p s  in th is  r e s e a r c h .  The f i r s t  i s  t o  analyse t h e  re la-  
tionship between t h e  cor re la t ion  of t h e  distribution and t h e  location of a r b i t r a r y  
(non-extreme) fixed points. The second is  t o  general ise  t h e  resu l t s  t o  o t h e r  less  
r e s t r i c t e d  probabil i ty distr ibutions.  I suspect  t h a t  t h e  same s o r t  of relat ionship 
between t h e  corre la t ion of t h e  distribution and fixed points will emerge. 
The final r emarks  have t o  d o  with migration. In th is  model, migration has  been 
t r e a t e d  as a p u r e  b i r th  process--People are born with r e g a r d  t o  t h e  N e w  World 
when they a r r i v e  t h e r e .  Where they are "born" depends, in t h e  funny way 
descr ibed,  on t h e  populations of people a l ready  in each  of t h e  two countries.  Un- 
fortunately,  with r e g a r d  t o  migration, people a lso  "die", t h a t  i s  t o  say ,  emigrate. 
In a fully blown model of migration, th is  should b e  taken into account.  (It is a lso  
t r u e  t h a t  mortality has  been ignored. Including mortality will not a f fec t  t h e  
resu l t s  if w e  assume t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no a g e  bias t o  t h e  choice  of destination, and t h a t  
both countr ies  su f fe r  t h e  same mortality schedule.) I think t h a t  i t  can  b e  a rgued  
t h a t  in t h e  per iod t h a t  I have  been r e f e r r i n g  to, emigration did not  play t h a t  big a 
ro le .  I t  is  t r u e  t h a t  Canada lost  population through emigration to t h e  United 
S ta tes ,  but  t h e r e  is  r eason  to believe t h a t  t h e  U.S. w a s  t h e  original  destination of 
many of t h e s e  people,  but  because  of di f fe rences  in t h e  regulations governing 
passenger  t r a f f i c  between Grea t  Britain and t h e  N e w  World, they found i t  c h e a p e r  
to t r a v e l  through Canada. I have ignored emigration h e r e  because  I have been 
trying to isolate t h e  e f fec t s  on a par t i cu la r  type  of system of increasing r e t u r n s  t o  
scale .  Migration cer ta in ly  exhibi ts  increasing r e t u r n s ,  and t o  t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  they 
are a n  important f a c t o r ,  and to t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  t h e  population is  heterogeneous  in 
t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  way, i t  (and many o t h e r  demographic processes)  can  b e  analysed 
using t h e  type  of model set out  h e r e .  
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